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Abstract
We show that there are games and decision situations in which it is
not possible for the decision maker to be rational a` la von Neumann-
Morgenstern in both situations simultaneously, which is the source of
the paradox presented in this note. We provide an assumption which
is the necessary and sufficient condition for a decision maker to be
rational in both situations.
JEL-Classification: D80
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1 Setting
Let G = (∆X,∆Y,U1,U2) be a game in mixed extension which is played
by Alice and Bob. The sets ∆X and ∆Y denote the set of all probability
distributions over the pure strategy set X = {x1, x2, ..., xm} of Alice and the
pure strategy set Y = {y1, y2, ..., yn} of Bob, respectively. We assume that
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G =
( L R
L 5, 10 5, 0
R 5, 0 5, 10
)
D =
(L R
L 5 5
R 5 5
)
Figure 1: A game and the associated decision problem, respectively. Numbers
represent (non-utility) monetary payoffs.
players are rational in the sense that their preferences in G can be represented
by a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vN-M) expected utility function Ui : ∆X×
∆Y → R for i ∈ {1, 2}. The function Ui is the bilinear extension of the
Bernoulli utility function Uˆi : X × Y → R for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Let Am×n and Bm×n be two matrices whose elements aij and bij denote
(non-utility) payoffs of Alice and Bob, respectively. We assume that when Al-
ice chooses xi and Bob chooses yj, Alice receives aij Euros
1 and Bob receives
bij Euros. Note that for a player, say for Alice, U1(xi, yj) is not necessarily
equal to the corresponding monetary payoff aij unless we assume that utility
is linear in money and players have purely selfish preferences.
Next, we introduce the decision problem D = (∆X,∆Y, u1) of Alice which
is associated to the game G; Alice’s monetary payoffs in D are identical to
those in G. We assume that Alice is rational in D, that is, her preferences
can be represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function
u1 : ∆X × ∆Y → R which is the bilinear extension of the Bernoulli utility
function uˆ1 : X×Y → R. The associated decision problem can be thought of
as a one-person game version of G in which Bob is replaced by an unconscious
lottery choosing actions. So there is no payoff for another player in the
decision problem. For example, Alice receives aij Euros when the outcome is
(xi, yj). See Figure 1 for an illustration of a game and its associated decision
problem.
Since Alice’s payoffs in the game are completely identical to her payoffs
in the associated decision problem, the difference in her preferences come
from the fact that she plays the game against a human player Bob, who also
receives payoffs. For each pair (aij, bij), define the function vˆ1 as vˆ1(aij, bij) :=
U1(xi, yj) − u1(xi, yj). The function vˆ1 represents Alice’s social preferences;
it represents the additional utility (or disutility) that Alice receives from the
outcome that Bob receives bij when she receives aij. We define the set of pair
1We assume monetary payoffs for simplicity.
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of feasible expected monetary payoffs as follows: M = {(apq, bpq) ∈ R2| apq =
pᵀAq and bpq = p
ᵀBq for (p, q) ∈ ∆X ×∆Y }. Then, we extend vˆ1 to M by
defining v1 : M → R as
v1(apq, bpq) = U1(p, q)− u1(p, q).
Example 1. Consider the game in Figure 1 in which Alice is inequality
averse; she suffers a disutility from uneven expected payoff distributions but
does not suffer any disutility from even ones. Suppose for the sake of argu-
ment that u1(L,L) = u1(R,L) = 5, and that Alice faces a utility loss of 1
both from the outcome (5, 10) and from the outcome (5, 0), i.e. v1(5, 10) =
v1(5, 0) = −1. It implies that we have U1(L,L) = U1(R,L) = 4. Now
consider the profile ((1
2
, 1
2
), L) in which Alice mixes 50-50 between L and
R, and Bob plays L. Since U1 and u1 are vN-M utility functions, we have
U1((12 , 12), L) = 4 and u1((12 , 12), L) = 5 which imply that v1(5, 5) = −1. This,
however, contradicts with our assumption that Alice suffers less disutility in
this case, that is, v1(5, 5) should have been zero.
The same conclusion can be obtained without assuming any specific value
for the v function as follows. We have v1(5, 10) = U1(L,L) − u1(L,L),
v1(5, 0) = U1(R,L) − u1(R,L) and v1(5, 5) = U1((12 , 12), L) − u1((12 , 12), L).
Since U1 and u1 are vN-M utility functions, the latter equation is equal to
1
2
U1(L,L) + 12U1(L,R)− 12u1(L,L)− 12u1(L,R) = 12v1(5, 10) + 12v1(5, 0). As a
result, we have v1(5, 5) =
1
2
v1(5, 10) +
1
2
v1(5, 0) which is in conflict with our
supposition that Alice faces a utility loss from outcomes (5, 10) and (5, 0).
The paradoxical result described above occurs due to the assumption
that Alice is rational both in the game and in the decision problem. To put
it differently, assuming rationality of Alice in one domain forces her to be
irrational2 in the other domain. To resolve the paradox, we introduce the
following restriction on the social preferences function.
Definition 1. A function v is called doubly linear if for all (apq, bpq) ∈M ,
v(apq, bpq) =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
piqjv(aij, bij).
The following theorem shows that doubly linearity of the social prefer-
ences function is a necessary and sufficient condition for a decision maker to
be rational both in games and in the associated decision problems.
2A person who is not rational.
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
L R
T 10, 20 10, 0
M 10, 0 10, 40
B 9, 0 9, 0

Figure 2: A game without a Nash equilibrium. Numbers represent monetary
payoffs.
Theorem 1. Suppose that u1 is a vN-M utility function. Then, U1 is a vN-M
utility function if and only if v1 is doubly linear.
Proof. ‘⇒’ By definition of v1, for each pair (apq, bpq) in M we have
v1(apq, bpq) = U1(p, q)−u1(p, q) (1)=
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
piqjU1(xi, yj)−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
piqju1(xi, yj)
(2)
=
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
piqj(u1(xi, yj) + v1(aij, bij))−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
piqju1(xi, yj)
(3)
=
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
piqjv1(aij, bij).
where Equation (1) is obtained by the assumption that U1 and u1 are vN-M
utility functions, and (2) is obtained by definition of v1. Finally, cancelling
out the terms we obtain (3).
‘⇐’ By definition of v1 we have U1(p, q) = u1(p, q) + v1(apq, bpq).
(4)
=
m∑
i=1
n∑
i=1
piqju1(xi, yj) +
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
piqjv1(aij, bij)
(5)
=
m∑
i=1
n∑
i=1
piqjU1(xi, xj).
where (4) is obtained by using our supposition that u1 is a vN-M utility
function and v1 is doubly linear. By definition of v1, we obtain (5).
Corollary 1. If a player is rational in a game, then he cannot be rational in
the associated decision problem unless his social preference function satisfies
doubly linearity.
The existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a game might be in
conflict with the rationality of a player in the associated decision problem.
The following example illustrates this situation.
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Example 2. Suppose that Alice is inequality averse as in Example 1, and
that Bob is self-regarding in the game in Figure 2. If we assume that Alice is
rational in the associated decision problem, then this game does not possess a
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. If we assume that this game has a Nash
equilibrium, then Alice cannot be rational in the associated decision problem.
First, suppose that Alice is rational in the decision problem. Notice that
there is no Nash equilibrium in which Bob plays a pure strategy. Because,
if Bob plays L, then the best response of Alice to L denoted by BR1(L)
is (1
2
, 1
2
, 0), but BR2((
1
2
, 1
2
, 0)) is R. Similarly, BR1(R) is (
3
4
, 1
4
, 0) however
BR2((
3
4
, 1
4
, 0)) is L. To reach a contradiction, suppose that p is a Nash
equilibrium strategy of Alice. Then, we have U2(p, L) = U2(p,R) which im-
plies 20p1 = 40p2 and p2 =
p1
2
. Since probabilities sum to 1, we obtain
p3 = 1 − p1 − p12 = 2−3p12 . Since 2−3p12 ≥ 0, we have p1 ≤ 23 . For all values
p1 <
2
3
, Bob’s unique best response is R, but we showed that there is no Nash
equilibrium corresponding to this case. If p1 =
2
3
, then p2 =
1
3
. But, (2
3
, 1
3
, 0)
is never best response, because it forces the outcome to be inequitable as the v
function will be negative; no matter what Bob plays, the expected payoffs will
be (10, 40
3
). Alice, however, can decrease Bob’s payoff sufficiently by deviating
to a strategy in which she puts some probability on B. For example, if Bob
plays (2
3
, 1
3
), Alice’s best response would be (27
37
, 0, 10
37
) whose expected payoffs
would be approximately (9.73, 9.73).
Second, one may construct a Nash equilibrium in this game by altering
the utilities as desired in the associated decision problem, since we do not
specify any particular type of irrationality of Alice in the decisin problem.
The main result in this note characterizes game and decision situations in
which the same person who makes a decision can be rational and irrational
simultaneously. This may challenge the belief that rationality is a personal
trait.
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